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Herbert Hoover's Technical Mission
to Yugoslavia, 1919-20*
Gary Dean Best
ON FEBRUARY 24, 1919, Congress appropriated $100 million
for the purpose of furnishing relief to neutral nations and to those
new nations which had been formed from the disintegration of the
Austrian and Russian empires. The money was provided as a
working fund for a new organization established by Congress to
maintain strict accountability of the money separately from other
food and relief organizations. Herbert Clark Hoover was named
director of the new organization, the American Relief Adminis-
tration. Thus, the man who had directed the relief of Belgium
and northern France before the war, and the U.S. Food Adminis-
tration during the war, was now called upon to direct what he
called America's "second intervention" in Europe—this one of
American food to conquer starvation and sickness. ' Now he be-
gan what Professor Harris G. Warren has called "a preview of the
later UNRRA, without the support of a United Nations."^ While
•Hoover's teehnieal missions to eastern Europe, 1919-1923, have been largely
neglected by historians. The only comprehensive study of any of the missions is
Donald R. Van Patten, "The European Technical Advisers and Post-War Aus-
tria. 1919-1923," a two volume unpublished Ph.D. dissertation of Stanford Uni-
versity, 1943. The only mission to publish its report vins the Barber mission to Po-
land. See A. B. Barber, Report of European Technical Advisers Mission to Po-
land, l9¡9-¡922 (New York, 1925). The papers of the European Technical Advis-
ers (72 boxes) are accessioned in the archives of the Hoover Institution on War,
Revolution and Peaee, Stanford, California.
The author acknowledges with gratitude the assistance received from the
Hoover Presidential Library Association which made possible research for this
article in 1972.
'Herbert Hoover, Memoirs (New York, 1951), I, 304.
'Harris G. Warren, Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression (New York,
1967), p. 23.
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his title was Director-General of Relief and Rehabilitation under
the Paris Peace Conference, in effect his operation was almost
wholly an American Relief Administration effort, and those who
njade it work throughout Europe were in many cases old Hoover
hands from the CRB and the Food Administration, some of them
now in uniform but loaned to Hoover by the armed forces for as
long as he might have need of them.
Relief was not alone a matter of procuring needed food sup-
plies. It soon developed that one major problem to be overcome
was that of transporting the supplies to the place of need once
they had reached European ports. As Hoover recalled in his
memoirs years later, the railroads of the whole of central and
eastern Europe "were in chaos," and the situation was made
worse by the newness of the national boundaries in the area.' The
railroads that had been consolidated under three empires were
now chopped up into eighteen different railroad systems under as
many jealous and often hostile governments. Thus, Hoover was
forced to organize a Transportation Section which sent experi-
enced American railway men to work with each of the govern-
ments in coordinating the movement of railway equipment across
national boundaries with the guarantee of the Transportation
Section that they would not be lost to the government which
owned them."
The American Relief Administration established by Congress
in connection with the $100 million appropriation came to an end
with the expiration of its authority on June 30, 1919, but the need
for a relief and rehabilitation agency like it continued. Thus, the
old American Relief Administration was replaced by a "new"
American Relief Administration—a private relief organization by
that name formed on July 12th and registered as a non-profit cor-
poration. Hoover presided over the new organization as chair-
man, with such Hoover food and relief veterans as Julius H.
Barnes, Edgar Rickard, William A. Glasgow, and others on the
board of directors.* While the new organization had no official
standing it did enjoy the confidence not only of the American gov-
ernment, but of the European governments as well, and it
assumed responsibility for the distribution of the remaining food
'Hoover. Memoirs. I. 310-320.
'Loc. cit.
Herbert Hoover, An American Epic (Chicago, 1959), III. 246-248.
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acquired with the funds provided by the Congressional appropria-
tion and from other sources. As the old ARA and the U.S. Grain
Corporation withdrew from the various countries in Europe, the
new ARA took over their functions, their offices and equipment,
while continuing their work without a break in the relief pro-
gram."
When the withdrawal of the old ARA from eastern Europe
called for the departure of the transporation experts assigned to
the governments there, some indicated their desire to Hoover that
this kind of assistance should be continued for some time after
the signing of the peace, Hoover's ARA had been the agency for
all monetary exchange transactions between the United States
and these nations during the armistice, and from those transac-
tions had various amounts of money which had accumulated to
the credit of those nations.' He now suggested to the governments
of Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia that they au-
thorize him to retain the necessary funds from these accounts
and, in his capacity as trustee, to appoint technical advisers ap-
propriate to the needs of the various countries. Poland and Aus-
tria accepted at once, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia somewhat
later.'
In the case of Yugoslavia, the proposal was first suggested to
that government through Professor M. I. Pupin, a Columbia Uni-
versity professor of Serb descent. On July 11th Hoover suggested
the plan to him verbally and followed it up with a letter the same
day. Hoover wrote that it appeared to him that Yugoslavia was
"in vital need of securing an eminent American Engineer with a
few assistants to act as the transportation adviser of the Govern-
ment." Aside from his intrinsic value to the Yugoslav Govern-
ment, he would also be of great assistance in at least five other
areas. He would be useful in obtaining railway materials and rail-
way financing from the United States; his knowledge of American
'Frank M, Surface and Raymond L. Bland, American Food in the World
War and Reconstruction Period (Stanford, 1931), pp. 73-74.
'William B. Poland to Minister Grouitch, March 23, 1922, European Tech-
nical Advisers Papers. Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stan-
ford, California, hereafter cited as ETA Papers. The Yugoslavs had a total of
$323,000 on deposit with the ARA, of which $150,000 was subsequently directed
to the technical advisers, the remainder to child feeding under the ARA.
'J. W. Krueger, "The Origin and Development of the European Technical
Advisers," ETA Papers, Krueger was assistant office manager in New York City.
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railway and manufacturing techniques would be of immense use
to the Yugoslavs; he would be of great use in negotiating with
surrounding governments and their railway administrations;
since Yugoslavia must rid herself of "the domination of Austrian
and Hungarian Engineers" who had formerly directed her rail-
ways, a disinterested group of American engineers would be use-
ful until Yugoslavia's own personnel were more largely developed;
and finally, he would be able to continue the useful work already
begun under the Transportation Section of the ARA in these
areas. It would be a simple matter. Hoover told the professor, to
set aside enough money from the remittance funds to support the
technical mission, and he would act as trustee for the payment of
salaries during the forthcoming year. "Immediate decision on
this matter is absolutely necessary," he wrote Pupin, "as these
engineers will be returned to the United States to resume their old
positions unless arrangements are set up at once.""
When a reply was not immediately forthcoming. Colonel Wil-
liam Causey, soon to be technical adviser to Austria, wired an
ARA representative in Belgrade describing Hoover's proposal
and suggesting that he "place before the Serbian government at
once the suggestion contained in this telegram and advise if they
desire action taken on same." Prompt action was necessary, he
said, since American personnel were leaving France very rapidly. '"
Causey's messenger, an army major, was, however, kept waiting
one and a half hours in the anteroom without an audience. "It
would appear," wrote one Hoover associate, "that our assistance is
not desired and it is humiliating to be begging to be allowed to give
it ."" Colonel William G. Atwood, whom Hoover proposed to em-
ploy as technical adviser to Yugoslavia, however, explained it dif-
ferently. The Yugoslavs were not being impolite, he said, it was
only that they have "so little ability to organize and so little com-
petent personnel available that such happenings are not to be
wondered a t . " ' ' More likely the Yugoslavs were somewhat con-
fused. The remittance funds, they were told, belonged to the Yu-
goslav Government. Now the American Relief Administration
'Hoover to Professor Pupin, July 11, 1919, ETA Papers.
'"Quoted in Causey to William Atwood, July 14, 1919. ETA Papers.
"Thomas Gregory to Atwood, July 17, 1919, ETA Papers.
"Atwood to Causey. July 19, 1919. ETA Papers.
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proposed to spend the money in their behalf. But what if the Yu-
goslav Government sought to use the money for some other pur-
pose? Hoover's wire to Colonel Causey was clear. The Yugoslavs
could not use the remittance money "for other purposes than
have our approval for specific use to be made of it." That ap-
proval, for the moment, centered on the technical adviser proposal
and it was necessary that they take quick action since "only a few
construction troops remain." To speed up a Yugoslav decision
the amount to be made available for the technical mission was in-
creased to $150,000 from the $100,000 originally proposed.'^
On July 26th the technical adviser proposal was made for-
mally through the U.S. Legation in Belgrade to the Yugoslav
Foreign Office." The matter was finally put before the Yugoslav
Council of Ministers on August 19th by the Minister of Commu-
nications. The technical advisers, he told the council,
would have as their mission to lend us their counsel and assistance in all
questions touching the reconstruction and putting in order of our rail-
ways, in order that they may be given over to regular traffic; as well as in
all questions regarding the reconstruction of our coal-mines; if that be-
comes necessary. The same experts would moreover co-operate in the
organization of transport of material for the railways purchased by the
Royal Government from the American Liquidation Commission in
France; moreover they will also co-operate, in all future orders for rail-
way material in America, putting us in touch, in this regard, with com-
petent American experts; in the transport of this same material from the
port to this country; in our relations with the banking establishments in
America, by giving us all the necessary instructions on this subject. Fi-
nally, these experts will include in their mission the re-establishment of
international traffic relations, principally with the newly formed states, a
relation which is vitally necessary to our country, and which was however
completely interrupted by the war.
The Minister of Communications added that Mr. Hoover had
pointed out "that it is his own organization which is at present
maintaining these international relations" and that a number of
governments had requested that the service be continued. There-
fore, Hoover had suggested, Yugoslavia might find it advisable to
make the same decision, though he wanted to avoid any appear-
ance of pressuring the Yugoslav Government to accept the ser-
vices of such a mission. The Minister of Communications recom-
mended acceptance of Hoover's proposal and the Council of Min-
''Hoover to Causey, July 17, 1919, ETA Papers,
"William G, Atwood, "Report of the Technical Mission of the Kingdom of
the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes [Yugoslavia]," ETA Papers,
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isters accepted it on August 22, 1919.'* The Yugoslav acceptance
of the proposition was, however, hedged with conditions—con-
ditions which seem more to have been the result of their misun-
derstanding the full details of the proposition than anything else
—and not until September 13th were the misunderstandings
cleared away and the proposition agreed to in such a way as to be
acceptable both to the Yugoslav Government and to Hoover and
the ARA."'
Colonel William G. Atwood, who had been head of the Trans-
poration Section of the American Relief Administration and the
American member of the Communications Section of the Su-
preme Economic Council, was named chief technical adviser to
the Yugoslav Government. Under Colonel Atwood were five other
technical advisers. Colonel C. S. Coe, Captain C. E. McMillan,
Captain J. H. Porter, Mr. J. H. Nelson, and Mr. H. I. Smith. All
but Smith and Porter had sailed to Yugoslavia by the end of Octo-
ber, 1919. Atwood himself remained in the United States until the
end of December carrying out the instructions of the Yugoslav
Government relative to obtaining loans and supplies. The instruc-
tions set forth by the Yugoslav Council of Ministers assigned the
technical advisers duties under seven categories:
1. To try to obtain a loan from the American government to pay for the
shipment of supplies already purchased by the Yugoslav Government
from the stocks of the United States Liquidation Board in France.
2. To obtain financing from the United States Government to cover the
purchase of additional U.S. War Department material in the United
States, and to pay for its shipment to Yugoslavia.
3. To co-operate with the technical advisers in other countries in rees-
tablishing international transportation relations.
4. To advise the Ministry of Mines in the reopening of destroyed mines,
the opening of new mines, and the securing of necessary materials
from the United States to carry out these activities.
5. To assist the Ministry of Finance in securing loans from American
bankers.
6. To advise the Ministry of Communications "in all matters pertaining
to the construction, reconstruction and operation of railways."
7. To assist any other ministries desiring their a id."
'^The Minister of Communications, M. Drachkovitch, to the Council of Min-
isters, August 19, 1919, with endorsement of August 22, 1919, translation en-
closed with H. Percival Dodge (U.S. Minister to Yugoslavia) to William Atwood,
October 4, 1919, ETA Papers.
"Hoover to Dodge, September 2, 1919; Atwood to Dodge, September 8,
1919; Dodge to Atwood, September 13, 1919, ETA papers.
'Ubid.
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To assist the technical advisers in Yugoslavia, as well as those
in Austria, Poland and Czechoslovakia, a liaison office was estab-
lished in Paris under Colonel James A. Logan, Jr., who was also
American representative on the European Coal Commission and
temporary American representative on the interim Reparation
Commission. The European Coal Commission was an indepen-
dent commission arranged by Hoover before he left for the United
States. It consisted of representatives of all the involved European
nations and of the United States. Colonel H. C. Nutt became
president and chairman of the European Coal Commission in
September. 1919, with his salary paid from the remittance funds
earmarked for the technical advisers of Austria, Poland and
Czechoslovakia. In addition to the Paris liaison office. Edgar
Rickard and William B. Poland were named as joint managers of
the technical adviser operation and directed it from the ARA of-
fices in New York City. The New York office, through its techni-
cal and business staff, was able to process inquiries from the tech-
nical advisers in behalf of the governments they represented, con-
cerning such matters as the procurement of machinery, supplies
and materials in the United States, from both private industrial
concerns and the surplus supplies of the War Department, and
also passed along to potential investors in the United States infor-
mation furnished them by the technical advisers concerning pos-
sible mining, agricultural and industrial opportunities for devel-
opment by American capital.'*
Relations between the technical advisers and the Yugoslav
Government were complicated by chronic political crises which
resulted in frequent cabinet changes. The instability of the gov-
ernment clouded even the original acceptance of Hoover's pro-
posal, as the cabinet making the agreement held only "a very
small majority" and was not expected to last very long." It was
not long after his arrival in Yugoslavia before Atwood was be-
moaning the unsettled condition of political affairs—a situation
which prevented "the formation of any permanent organizations
in any of the Departments" with the results that "the temporary
organizations existing do not have the authority or the cohesion
"Krueger. "Origin and Development." ETA Papers; Donald R. Van Patten,
"The European Teehnieal Advisers and Post-War Austria, 1919-1923." (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1943), I, 295-300.
"Dodge to Hoover, August 24. 1919. ETA Papers.
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that they need for efficiency."" In April and May of 1920 condi-
tions became so bad that Atwood felt if the Cabinet then in power
continued in office "ourservices are useless and not desired. . . ."^'
In June conditions improved slightly with at least the Prime Minis-
ter and the Minister of Communications so that Atwood could re-
port that all in the technical mission were "busy and happy" that
month. ' ' There now seemed a possibility that the mission might be
able to continue. In mid-June Atwood considered it "a bare possi-
bility that they may want us to stay longer."" However, the record
of spotty relations with the Yugoslav Government was not encour-
aging to the New York office. As the $150,000 allocated for the
mission began to run low, the New York office advised Atwood that
the technical mission "should be formally wound up not later
than October first [1920], unless we have a specific communica-
tion in writing from the Prime Minister requesting us to con-
tinue. . . ." Should this latter occur, the Yugoslav Government
would have to provide the funds for the continuation of the tech-
nical mission through an appropriation of its own.'' Scarcely had
Atwood received this instruction from the New York office before
conditions again worsened, with the cabinet being voted out and
governmental affairs reaching a standstill."
During its brief tenure in Yugoslavia the technical mission did
manage to accomplish some of the work assigned to it by the Yu-
goslav Government. The first of the duties assigned it was carried
out in full. Mr. Hoover was able to secure permission from the
United States Treasury to use up to $660,000 of unexpended
funds loaned to Yugoslavia, and then in the hands of the U.S.
Grain Corporation, to pay for ocean freight on the material pur-
chased by Yugoslavia from the United States Liquidation Board
in France." In this case the contribution of the technical mission
was utilized effectively, for the funds were subsequently used for
the purpose intended. The second of the duties assigned to the
technical mission, however, did not end so happily. While the
technical mission, through the New York office, succeeded in ob-
"Atwood to Logan, March 1, 1920, ETA Papers.
''Atwood to Poland, May 14, 1920, ETA Papers.
"Logan to New York Office, June 7, 1920. ETA Papers.
"Atwood to Poland, June 14. 1920, ETA Papers.
"Poland to Atwood, July 16, 1920, ETA Papers.
»Atwood to Poland, July 24, 1920, ETA Papers.
"Norman O. Davis to Hoover, November 21. 1919, ETA Papers.
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taining a $25 million credit from the U.S. War Department for
the purchase of war surplus material and equipment, and a credit
from the U.S. Shipping Board for the shipment of any material
and equipment thus purchased, the Yugoslav Government failed
to take advantage of either credit.
Before he left the United States for Yugoslavia, Atwood was
instructed by the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs to purchase a
list of material and equipment from War Department surplus
stocks. As Atwood later explained it: "Minister Lukinitch stated
that he had available the money to buy this material and re-
quested me to get it, but I was not able to secure information as to
where the money was or how to draw on it." Atwood, therefore,
left the matter in the hands of the New York office with instruc-
tions to purchase the material "or material as nearly like it as
possible" from War Department stocks once the War Depart-
ment credit came through. The material was subsequently
selected but no authority came from the Yugoslav Government
for the purchase. The Minister of Communications also asked the
technical mission to purchase thirteen locomotive cranes. Again,
the necessary official authorizaion was not received until the
cranes had been sold to others. Finally:
As all these artieles were being sold rapidly, and, as I had reeeived defi-
nite instructions from Minister Lukinitch to use our own judgment in
selecting substitute material, the office proceeded to close a contract
with the United States War Department as representing [the Yugoslav
Government) for about $525,000.00 worth of material. This contract is
now repudiated by the Minister of Telegraph, apparently for the reason
that the Engineers of the Department do not know the uses of the substi-
tute material and have not enough experience to enable them to take ad-
vantage of i t ."
The Yugoslav Government, therefore, was in the position of re-
fusing to buy that which was available from War Department
stocks and continuing to press for the purchase of that which was
not available. On June 23rd, the New York office cancelled all or-
ders it had placed in behalf of the Yugoslav Government." The
result was that the Yugoslav Government obtained very little
benefit from the success of the technical mission in obtaining the
requested credits.
Aside from its assistance in opening negotiations with Greece
"Atwood to Yugoslav Minister of Finance. June 18. 1920. ETA Papers.
"Memorandum from Rickard. June 23. 1920. ETA Papers.
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for the reestablishment of railroad traffic between Belgrade and
Athens, the technical mission contributed very little to the resto-
ration of international transportation services, the reason being,
as Atwood explained it, that the technical advisers "were not fur-
nished any information by the Minister of Communications nor
did he request their assistance."" The mission pressed consider-
able advice on the Ministry of Mines, based on extensive surveys
of existing and potential mining sites, but its recommendations
were little heeded. As for the instruction that the mission should
advise the Ministry of Finance, Atwood conferred with a number
of American bankers and corporations doing business in Europe
concerning the possibility of the Yugoslav Government securing
commercial loans in the United States. However, the Ministry of
Finance apparently changed its mind on the question of obtaining
American fmancial assistance and did not follow up on the infor-
mation Atwood furnished it. The only request for assistance of
any importance from the Ministry of Finance came in connection
with the possibility of placing a concession in the United States
for the development of the Ljubija iron mine and the construction
of a steel plant. Inquiries by the technical mission led to some in-
terest on the part of American enterprises, but nothing resulted.'"
The principal duties of the technical mission, therefore, con-
tinued to be those for which the Transportation Section had been
primarily responsible during the armistice—acting as advisors to
the Ministry of Communications on railway problems. The Minis-
try furnished two railway cars to the technical mission and these
were "in almost constant service" during the life of the mission,
furnishing the means by which the advisers could survey the rail-
road system. Immediately after the return of advisers from such in-
spection trips, reports were made to the Minister of Communica-
tions concerning items of interest and containing recommenda-
tions by the advisers. All told, some fifty such reports were sub-
mitted to the Ministry. Recommendations were made concerning
repairs to the lines, improvements in shop and engine-house facili-
ties, operating methods on the railways, and proposed new lines,''
One new line suggested, from Belgrade to the Adriatic port of Cat-
"Atwood, "Report of the Technical Mission," ETA Papers,
'"Loc. cit.
"Loe. cit.
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taro, was approved by the Ministry in late 1920."
Atwood was ever alert to possible opportunities for American
capital and American sales. Before he left the United States for
Yugoslavia he conferred with engineering firms in the United
States, and with officials of Western Electric, concerning the pos-
sibility of a telephone and telegraph franchise in Yugoslavia. The
Yugoslav Government of late 1919 seemed interested, while
doubting that such a concession was possible under the Berne
Convention." The main thing, however, in Atwood's mind was
that the Yugoslav telephone and telegraph system should be
modernized, since it would be Western Electric equipment that
would be used no matter who did the work or operated the sys-
tem. However, it seemed more desirable for the modernization to
be undertaken as a concession so as not to put "any further strain
on the financial resources of the country. . . . " " Early in 1920
Atwood proposed to the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs that he
should initiate such a modern communications system based on
the latest inventions. There were two methods, he told the minis-
ter, by which the government could provide such a system. The
Yugoslav Government could construct it, investing about $15 mil-
lion and employing American engineers "to design and superin-
tend the construction and operation of the system because this
new apparatus and the new methods are almost entirely of Ameri-
can invention and manufacture." Or, they could "give a franchise
to a company—necessarily American—to construct and operate
the wire lines." Atwood suggested that J. G. White & Company,
an American engineering firm, be encouraged to organize a com-
pany in connection with Western Electric and a group of fman-
ciers to carry through such a project. He had, he told the minis-
ter, had conferences with Mr. White, with bankers, and with rep-
resentatives of Western Electric and "found them favorably dis-
posed toward such an investment."" The Minister of Posts and
Telegraphs in the new cabinet, however, was not interested."
Moreover, the evidence of political instability in Yugoslavia had
"New York Herald, November 3, 1920.
"Atwood to J. G. White, December 20. 1919, ETA Papers.
"Atwood to Coe, November 12, 1919, ETA Papers.
"Atwood to Mr. Lukinitch, Minister of Posts & Telegraphs, Februarv 7
1920, ETA Papers.
"Atwood to W. E. Leigh, February 19, 1920. ETA Papers.
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cooled the interest of J. G. White and Company, which now ex-
pressed disinterest in Yugoslavian investments until that country
had "settled down into its normal life, has demonstrated that its
Government is stable and that it will treat foreign investments
fairly. . . . ""
Undiscouraged, Atwood continued to seek to interest Ameri-
can capital in Yugoslavian projects. To United States Steel he
suggested that the extension of credits would secure for that com-
pany numerous contracts for the replacement of railway and
highway bridges in Yugoslavia.^' To the New York office he sug-
gested that J. G. White or some other engineering firm be encour-
aged to investigate the possibility of a franchise for a tramway be-
tween Belgrade and Zemun. The New York office, however, could
stimulate no interest in the project.^' Nor could Atwood interest
anyone in the construction of Yugoslavian hydro-electric plants
unless that construction was to be paid for "in American gold, be-
cause this is the only kind of money that means anything to us
these days.""" In mid-March the New York office wrote Atwood
that the proposals he was submitting to them for consideration by
capitalists or by engineering companies would be interesting to
them only if accompanied "by valuable concessions or secured
. . . by mines or other real values. . . ."•"
Once Atwood turned to mining properties he attracted some-
what more interest, but scarely any more action. When he in-
formed New York of a coal proposition involving "good grade lig-
nite suitable [for] strip mining," the Matthew Addy Company of
Cincinnati at least expressed some interest in further details." On
April 7th the technical mission offered to New York what seemed
the best opportunity either for development as a concession or as
collateral for loans—the Ljubija iron mine in Bosnia, one of the
richest mining properties in the kingdom. Colonel Coe described
it as covering an area 40 kilometers long and 34 kilometers wide
" J . G. White to Rickard, March 2, 1920, ETA Papers.
"Atwood to Victor G. Thomassen, February 19. 1920. ETA Papers.
"Atwood to Poland, February 27. 1920. ETA Papers; J. G. White to Riek-
ard. March 2, 1920. ETA Papers.
'"George W. Bacon to Atwood, March 9, 1920. ETA Papers.
"Rickard and Poland to Logan for Atwood. March 15. 1920, ETA Papers.
"Atwood to New York office, March 19. 1920; James A. Green to Poland.
March 27, 1920; Poland, March 27. 1920; Poland to James A. Green, April 1.
1920. ETA Papers.
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and estimated its potential at a half-billion British pounds ster-
ling."' On April 16th he forwarded additional mining reports to
New York with the comment that "the best chance for capital in-
vestment at the present time is in mines," and that there had been
a number of people there looking for concessions, most of them
Englishmen."" Meantime, Edgar Rickard was providing the
American International Corporation with some of the mining
propositions he had been receiving from Atwood. On April 3,
1920, he wrote John Power Hutchins of the AIC concerning a
chromium deposit Atwood had suggested, asking if the AIC
might be interested. "We have technical advisers also to the Po-
lish, Austrian and Czech governments," he informed Hutchins.
"Atwood is particularly active in sending us information of this
character. The others would also, if encouraged. We are in daily
communication by cable if you want further information. We
have on file a choice assortment of other projects.""* On April
19th he was invited to lunch with Hutchins and a number of sen-
ior executives of the American International Corporation.""
The American International Corporation was not interested in
the chromium mines, however, nor in any other proposition yet
offered by the technical missions. They were delighted at the
opportunity afforded us by Hutchins to come into closer contact with
your work to enjoy the benefit of such suggestions for the investment of
American capital as may come to you from time to time through Techni-
cal Advisers. It is unnecessary to stress the fact to you that general condi-
tions in this country make it extremely difficult to take advantage of the
many opportunities for investment which must constantly arise in Eu-
rope. Nevertheless, we will appreciate a continued interest on your part
even though, as in this specific case, we are unable to give favorable con-
sideration to these suggestions."
As for the Ljubija mine, Hutchins' own research revealed a more
modest estimate of the area's iron ore reserves—an estimated
amount which was "not brilliant" in its prospects."» With Hutch-
ins' approval the New York office wired Coe in Belgrade that
"unless conditions for acquiring control Ljubija iron mine and
"Coe to New York Office, April 7, 1920, ETA Papers.
"Atwood to Logan, April 16, 1920; Atwood to Rickard, April 16, 1920. ETA
Papers.
"Rickard to Hutchins, April 3, 1920, ETA Papers,
"Hutchins to Rickard, April 20, 1920, ETA Papers.
"William Franklin Sans to Rickard, April 24, 1920, ETA Papers.
"Hutchins to Rickard, April 22, 1920, ETA Papers.
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proven volume brilliantly attractive there is little chance of inter-
esting Americans. However, American International prepared to
learn details and discuss terms." Hutchins was en route to Paris
via London, to arrive in mid-May. Poland and Rickard suggested
that Coe discuss the matter with him then." However, Hutchins
was so little interested in the project that he did not feel justified
even in traveling to Belgrade to investigate it.'" Nor was he moved
by the news from Atwood that an Anglo-French syndicate was
"trying to get posssession of the property on a concession basis"
and that there was an immediate market for the ore in Czechoslo-
vakia and in France and England.*' Stymied in their search for
foreign capital to develop the Ljubija mines, the technical advisers
now found that the Yugoslav Government, too, was not "so anx-
ious to use this concession as a basis for a loan as the former
Cabinet had been.""
While Atwood continued to try to interest American Interna-
tional Corporation and others in carrying out projects in Yugosla-
via, his efforts were to no avail. Early in June, William B. Poland
wrote Atwood from the New York office that he hoped he
wouldn't
be discouraged over the lack of interest which we have been able to stir up
in the [Yugoslav] projects. Your industrial and mining reports are inter-
esting and valuable and are being classified and put in shape to present
to any other that we think may be induced to give them attention. The
fact of the matter is that just at the moment no one will investigate any
overseas projects. The feeling is that the condition is too uncertain, and
there is such an enormous demand for money in the United States that
there is little inducement to go abroad with it. However, these conditions
are likely to change at any time and banks and other people tell us that
they want to be kept in touch with the situation and hope to be able to
take an active interest later on . "
"Later on," however, was to be too late where the Yugoslav tech-
nical mission was concerned. The next month Atwood pressed the
Yugoslav Government for a decision on whether the technical
mission was to be continued under financial arrangements to be
"Poland and Rickard to Coe. April 23, 1920. ETA Papers.
^"Hutchins to Logan. April 6. 1920. James A. Logan Papers. Hoover Institu-
tion on War, Revolution and Peace. Stanford, California; Logan to Atwood. June
3, 1920, ETA Papers.
"Atwood to Hutchins. June 5. 1920. ETA Papers.
"Memorandum of Interview at Office of Minister of Mines. June 8th—Bel-
grade. June 9. 1920." ibid.
"Poland to Atwood. June 7. 1920, ibid.
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made by that government. But Atwood, in pressing for an answer
concerning the continuation of the mission, also gave voice to his
complaints concerning the failure of the Yugoslav Government to
make adequate use of the services of the technical advisers. Wrote
Atwood to the Yugoslav Prime Minister:
The Advisory Staff does not feel that the Royal Government has received
the benefit from their services that it should have had during the past
year. The various Ministers have not called upon the advisers to the ex-
tent which the advisors desired them to and the Advisory Mission has,
therefore, not been able to do the things for which it was fitted and for
which it had been employed, although many requests were made of the
Ministers for the opportunity to do this work. It is hoped that if the
Royal Government decides that it desires the continuation of the work of
the Advisory Mission a greater use will be made of the service of the Ad-
visors, Otherwise, it will be difficult to secure the services of any of the
present Staff on account of the dissatisfaction with the amount of work
which they have been permitted to do. If, therefore, the Royal Govern-
ment decides to continue the Mission it should be with the understand-
ing that a greater use will be made of the Mission in the ensuing year,"
The Yugoslav Government did not immediately reply. When it
did, the reply was in the negative, though the Yugoslav Govern-
ment did express its "great gratitude for work accom-
plished, , . . " " Arrangements were made to close up the mission
by the first of September,
As the mission was being closed down in early September,
Herbert Hoover wrote Atwood:
Poland and Rickard have reviewed to me the [Yugoslav] position and I
have great sympathy with you in the trials and tribulations which you
have confronted with such a fine spirit. It is a shock to us to find that the
Serbians in their distressed condition, should not take full advantages of
the services which you placed at their disposal. Under these circum-
stances for your own professional record as much as our protection it is
very essential you prepare carefully a report covering your activities and
the constructive suggestions which you placed at the disposal of the [Yu-
goslav] Government,*'
The technical mission to Yugoslavia was certainly the least
successful of the four missions established in eastern Europe by
Hoover's American Relief Administration. The other three mis-
sions lasted longer and accomplished a good deal more. Some
confusion seems to have resulted from the failure of both Atwood
and the Yugoslavs to understand that the purpose of the techincal
"Atwood to Prime Minister Vesnitch, July 23, 1920, ibid.
"Logan to New York Office, August 9, 1920, ibid.
"Hoover to Atwood, September 11, 1920, ibid.
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mission was to advise the Yugoslav Government—as employees of
that government whose fundamental concern must be the interest
of Yugoslavia—that the mission was not in Belgrade to represent
the United States, or American or other interests." As James Lo-
gan wrote Rickard from Paris,
Atwood . . . always has too much the "mission idea" in his mind that
. . . may have lost considerable confidence with the [Yugoslav] Govern-
ment. . . . I have written repeatedly that he is not a mission and that his
sole interest should be directed in the interests ofthe [Yugoslav] Govern-
ment, who are paying him. . . .
That Logan's arguments had had little effect is indicated by his
closing comment, "It is pretty hard to drive a nail in oak."^' It
was perhaps Atwood's view ofthe technical advisers as an Ameri-
can mission to Czechoslovakia that led him to spend so much of
the advisers' effort on seeking to advance the penetration of
American capital into Yugoslavia.
Nevertheless, a good deal ofthe technical mission's effort was
directed toward advising and assisting the Yugoslav Government
in post-war reconstruction. And in Poland, Austria, and Czecho-
slovakia this was even more the case. When taken in conjunction
with the relief functions of the ARA during this same period
through such agencies as the European Children's Fund, it is ap-
parent that Professor Warren's comment that Hoover was run-
ning a kind of UNRRA during the armistice period remained true
to a slightly lesser degree for some time even after the signing of
the peace treaties. Professor Harold H. Fisher has remarked on
the similarity between the activities of Hoover's technical missions
in eastern Europe and the Point Four program for lesser devel-
oped nations under President Truman." One might also view the
coal commission as a forerunner of the cooperative approach to
European coal and other economic problems that found fuller ex-
pression after World War II, beginning with the European Coal
and Steel Community.
While the Yugoslav technical mission ended in September,
1920, the others continued in operation, serving the nations to
which they were attached for periods varying from two to four
"Atwood at Logan, March 1, 1920, ibid,
^•Logan to Rickard, April 23, 1920, ibid,
"Conversation with the author, August, 1971.
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years. When Hoover entered the Harding Cabinet in March,
1921, however, he severed his connection with the technical mis-
sions, designating Poland and Rickard as trustees for the remit-
tance funds in his place. William B. Poland resigned in 1922, the
same year that the technical mission to Poland came to an end,
and the technical mission to Austria ended the following year."" It
is to be hoped that the full impact of Hoover's technical missions
on the reconstruction of eastern Europe will before long be
assessed by historians dealing with that part of the world.
'"Van Patten, "The European Technical Advisers," I. 312; II. 395.
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The Hoover- Wilson Correspondence, by Francis William O'Brien.
Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1974. pp. xxvi, 297.
There can be little doubt that Herbert Hoover, even forty
years after his departure from the White House, still constitutes
one of the greatest mysteries of the American twentieth century.
Fortunately, Francis William O'Brien's The Hoover-Wilson Cor-
respondence provides historians with a compact collection of pri-
mary source materials which shed light on Herbert Hoover and
clarify some of the historical confusion and ignorance still sur-
rounding his pre-presidential career. O'Brien has compiled 201
letters written by Hoover to Wilson, and 97 letters from Wilson to
Hoover, all of them drafted between September 24, 1914 and
November 11, 1918. Brief but effective commentaries composed
by Mr. O'Brien accompany the letters and place them into a
proper context and perspective.
The letters comprising the book are almost exclusively con-
cerned with the economic and political difficulties Hoover en-
countered during World War I as he directed the Commission on
Belgium Relief and the Food Administration. The letters from
Hoover often explicitly detail his opinions, while Wilson's re-
sponses are for the most part brief acknowledgements or agree-

